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Dysthymia and major depression: distinct conditions or different stages along a one-
dimensional continuum? 
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Abstract 
Until recently researchers have discussed whether dysthymia and major depression 
represent distinct conditions or rather different stages along a one-dimensional continuum. 
This study addresses this question by examining the belief systems of normal, dysthymic, and 
depressed participants. We explored participants‘ beliefs and differentiated between positive 
and negative as well as between core and peripheral beliefs. Normal participants showed 
fewer negative beliefs and negative peripheral beliefs than the dysthymic group, whereas 
normal participants had more positive beliefs and positive core beliefs as well as fewer 
negative core beliefs than the depressed group. The hypothesized one-dimensional continuum 
could not be demonstrated for the belief systems. Instead, the data point to the conclusion that 
our idea of a one-dimensional continuum reaching from normal to dysthymic to depressed was 
too simple. Apparently, the differences in the belief systems reported here are related to the 
chronic character and severity of the mood disorder. 
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Until recently it has been debated whether dysthymia and major depression represent 
distinct conditions or whether both disorders form different stages along a one-dimensional, 
clinically relevant continuum of unipolar depression. Both positions have experienced 
empirical support.  
The view that dysthymia and major depression are distinct conditions is supported by 
differences between the groups with regard to evoked potentials (EPs; Howland & Thase, 
1991) and Axis I and II comorbidity (Markowitz, Moran, Kocsis, & Frances, 1992; Pepper, 
Klein, Anderson, Riso, Ouimette, & Lizardi, 1995), family history of mood and personality 
disorders (Klein, Riso, Donaldson, Schwartz, Anderson, Ouimette, Lizardi, & Aronson, 
1995), and different outcomes in naturalistic follow-up studies (e. g. Klein, Schwartz, Rose, & 
Leader, 2000).  
However, there is also evidence for the hypothesis that dysthymia and major depression are 
different stages along a one-dimensional, clinically relevant continuum: dysthymic patients 
and patients with major depression are indistinguishable in the neurophysiological 
abnormalities in sleep patterns (Akiskal, Judd, Gillin, & Lemmi, 1997); epidemiological 
studies (Despland, Monod, & Ferrero, 1995; Judd, Akiskal, & Paulus, 1997) and prospective 
clinical follow-up studies (Judd, et al., 1998) also support this view. 
Schwartz and Garamoni (1986), in their structural model of positive and negative states of 
mind, also postulate a continuum reaching from normal to dysthymic to depressive. Schwartz 
and Garamoni’s (1986) model proposes that normal functioning is characterized by an optimal 
balance between positive and negative beliefs, thoughts, and emotions and that 
psychopathology is marked by deviation from this balance. Dysthymia and major depression 
are distinguished by the direction, magnitude, duration, and frequency of deviation from the 
optimal balance (Garamoni, Reynolds, Thase, Frank, & Fasiczka, 1992). Whereas normal 
subjects show a predominance of positive elements, the balance in dysthymia patients seems 
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to be distorted in favor of the negative elements, resulting, eventually, in the predominance of 
negative elements in depressed patients. This model has been supported by a variety of studies 
(Burgess & Haaga, 1994; Garamoni, Reynolds, Thase, Frank, & Fasiczka, 1991; Garamoni, et 
al., 1992; Kendall, 1992). 
A. T. Beck’s cognitive model of depression (1976, 1987, 1997) states that the beliefs of 
depressed patients play a central role in the development and maintenance of depressive 
symptoms. Beliefs are stable, general basic assumptions about the nature of the world and its 
relationship to the elements mentioned above (Beck, A. T., 1976, 1987, 1997). When 
activated, beliefs guide the perception and interpretation of situations, leading to better 
perception, memory, and recall of information that is congruent to the beliefs, as opposed to 
incongruent information. Therefore, negative beliefs influence or mediate thoughts and 
emotions (Beck, A. T., 1991). Stiles, Schröder, and Johansen (1993) tested this hypothesis by 
inducing sad vs. neutral mood in student subjects. According to A. T. Beck’s (1967) model, 
the strength of the respective sad mood should depend on the nature of the beliefs. It has been 
shown that the beliefs indeed influenced the thoughts, which in turn influenced the emotions 
(Stiles et al., 1993). 
With regard to these findings about the importance of beliefs, it seems worthwhile to 
investigate the beliefs of normal, dysthymic, and depressed subjects and the similarities and 
differences between the groups. We decided to subdivide them into positive vs. negative 
beliefs according to Schwartz and Garamoni (1986) and into core beliefs vs. peripheral beliefs 
according to Safran, Vallis, Segal, and Shaw (1986). According to Safran et al. (1986), central 
cognitive processes, so-called core beliefs, can be differentiated from peripheral beliefs using 
the following criteria:  
1) Core beliefs are those related to the individual’s basic identity in the world or to the 
fundamental sense of the self. 
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2) Core beliefs can be distinguished by their ability to predict an individual’s emotional 
and behavioral responses to a wide range of situations. 
3) Any attempt to modify core beliefs is likely to evoke strong anxiety. 
4) Peripheral beliefs are subsumed under, or derived from, core cognitive processes. 
Thus, according to the authors, core beliefs can be recognized by:  
1) Self-referent cognitions 
Self-referent cognitions are more central than other cognitions because they are closely 
related to the patient. For a patient with heterosocial anxiety, for example, who has the 
beliefs “I am unlovable” and “Women are all cold and rejecting”, the first belief is 
considered more central because it is directly related to the patient.  
2) Common themes 
Core beliefs have similar themes. Ellis, for example, classifies lovability and 
competence as the main cause for psychological problems. According to A. T. Beck, 
Rush, and Shaw (1979), depressed people foster self-worth on the love and respect 
demonstrated by others as the most relevant themes. Safran et al. (1986) assume that 
these are the themes of core beliefs. 
3) Cross-situational consistency 
A main characteristic of core beliefs, according to Safran et al. (1986), is their 
consistent influence on different kinds of situations. 
4) Process markers vs. content markers 
Core beliefs are associated with strong emotions, and accordingly the discovery of core 
beliefs will trigger strong emotional reactions.  
5) Learning from ineffective strategies 
Peripheral beliefs may be resistant to change because they are derived from a core 
belief about the self. 
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6) In accordance with Kelly (1955), Safran et al. (1986) state that a change of core beliefs 
is associated with great anxiety; thus, anxiety can help identify core beliefs. 
J. Beck (1995) enlarged this list of characteristics with which to identify core beliefs by 
recommending the examination of the power of convictions, in addition to the previous 
suggestion to explore three typical situations and to be aware of strong, negative emotions. 
According to J. Beck (1995), strong confidence identifies the respective belief as a core belief.  
Based on these characteristics and with special attention to core beliefs, we examined 
beliefs of normal, dysthymic, and depressed subjects. As depressed patients mainly recall 
negative self-relevant situations, we used personal strain situations, thus creating a base line in 
the sense of negative life events (Teasdale & Dent, 1987). Thus, we are able to examine 
whether dysthymia and major depression can be considered distinct conditions or whether 
they are different stages of the same clinically relevant continuum of unipolar depression. In 
accordance with Akiskal et al. (Akiskal et al., 1997; Judd et al., 1997; 1998) and Schwartz and 
Garamoni (1986), we expected the dysthymic subjects to take a position between the normal 
and depressed poles, as a continuum ranging from normal to dysthymic to depressed would 
suggest (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986). We also expected to find this continuum in the core 
belief system of the respective group, i.e., the normal subjects should express more positive 
core beliefs than depressed subjects, whereas the value of the dysthymic subjects should lie 
between those of the other groups. For peripheral beliefs, similar results were expected 
because core beliefs affect them via their influence on information processing, thus creating a 
homogeneous belief system (Beck, A. T., & Rush, 1985). This has also been suggested by 
other authors (e. g., Young, 1994). It has to be considered, however, that, according to J. Beck 
(1995), there are also “compensatory” beliefs which, in contrast to peripheral beliefs which 
are congruent to core beliefs, are expected to circumscribe negative core beliefs’ influence. 
Therefore, different patterns might be found for peripheral and core beliefs. For example, an 
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increase in negative core beliefs might go along with an increase in compensatory (positive) 
peripheral beliefs, thus preventing significant differences in positive peripheral beliefs 
between the three groups.  
Following A. T. Beck and Rush (1985), as well as Young (1994), however, we expected 
consistent belief systems with peripheral beliefs to also follow the continuum from normal to 
dysthymic to depressed subjects: normal subjects should express more positive peripheral 
beliefs than dysthymic and depressed subjects, whereas the value of the dysthymic subjects 




The participants for this study were recruited by articles in the local press and by posted 
announcements. 202 women volunteered to complete the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, 
Beck, A. T., & Steer, 1987). The age of the normal participants (n = 20) varied from 20 to 49 
years, with a mean of 25.5 and a standard deviation of 8.24 years. The dysthymic participants 
(n = 20) ranged in age from 21 to 43 with a mean of 30.5 and a standard deviation of 9.1 
years. The participants in the depressed group (n = 20) varied within the range of 20 and 57 
years, with a mean of 30.58 and a standard deviation of 12.52 years. There was no significant 
age-related difference between the groups (Chi(2) = .91, p = .414).  
The BDI (Beck, A. T., & Steer, 1987) and the SCID-I (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, 
1996) were used as selection instruments. Participants with a BDI value of at least 16 points 
and a diagnosis of major depression on the SCID-I were categorized as the depressed group, 
whereas participants with a minimum of 16 points on the BDI and a diagnosis of dysthymia 
on the SCID-I without any lifetime major depression episode comprised the dysthymic group. 
Participants were categorized within the normal/control group if their BDI value did not 
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exceed ten points and if they were not classified to a certain diagnosis on the SCID-I. The 
SCID-interview was conducted by doctoral students with two and three years of therapeutical 
experience, who had passed a SCID-training program. The final psychiatric diagnoses are 
provided by consensus of two SCID interviewers according to Spitzer’s procedure (Spitzer, 
1983). The interrater reliability concerning affective disorders was 0.95 (kappa). The BDI for 
the normal participants had a range of zero to nine with a mean of 4.92 and a standard 
deviation of 3.37, and the dysthymic participants had a range of 17 to 42 with a mean of 25.88 
and a standard deviation of 8.84. The depressed participants had a range of 17 to 38 with a 
mean of 28.50 and a standard deviation of 7.10. These values of dysthymic and depressed 
participants are within the range found for depressed patients in several German psychiatric 
populations (Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, & Keller, 1994). 
The participants were not allowed to take any medication two weeks before the experiment 
since this could have had an effect on the symptoms (Becker-Carus, Heyden, & Ziegler, 
1979). 
Measures 
The exploration of individual beliefs, thoughts, and emotions was carried out in accordance 
with A. T. Beck’s (1967) approach. The participants were asked to recall a situation in which 
they had felt depressed and rejected. To explore thoughts and emotions, A. T. Beck’s (1976) 
three-column technique was used. With this technique, interviewer and participant work 
together in dividing the imaginary situation into external events (description of surroundings 
and people involved, the behavior of the participant and others involved), emotions, and 
thoughts. For each emotion, the interviewer asked the participant whether there was any 
thought associated with this particular emotion. The same procedure was applied to every 
thought named by the participant. Thus, we were able to classify thoughts as positive or 
negative afterwards. In order to explore the beliefs, the downward arrow technique by Burns 
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(1999) was utilized. Using this procedure, we asked participants, based on the thoughts 
explored in the three-column technique: “What would it mean to you if [thought of the 
subject] matched reality?” The first answer was recorded and the question was repeated. It is 
assumed that an important belief is discovered when the subject repeatedly describes the same 
statement with similar words. This procedure was repeated for each thought named by the 
participants. Finally, the participants estimated the intensity for each emotion, the degree of 
engagement for each thought, and the strength of conviction for each belief. The questions 
read as follows:  
”On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strong is this emotion compared to the maximum 
strength imaginable for this emotion?” 
”On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strongly have you been preoccupied with this thought 
compared to the maximum strength imaginable?” 
”On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strong is your conviction about this belief?” 
These interviews were conducted by clinical psychologists with two and three years of 
therapeutic experience, who had passed a qualifying training. 
Subsequently, the beliefs, thoughts, and emotions were subdivided into positive and 
negative elements. For this, we used the same procedure as in preceding research (Derry & 
Kuiper, 1981; Missel & Sommer, 1983; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986), following the Affects 
Balance Scale (Derogatis, 1975) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Based on their association as given by the participant, both thought 
and affiliated emotion were assigned to the same category. Thereby, emotions were assigned 
to the categories “positive” or “negative” according to their affective valence. Categorization 
of beliefs into positive and negative beliefs was done differently; beliefs were classified as 
being negative (dysfunctional or irrational) if they expressed or implied dogmatic, rigid, 
illogical, global ideas about oneself, other persons, and/or the world (e. g. “Nobody likes me”; 
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Beck, A. T., 1976; Beck, J., 1995; Ellis, 1991, 1997). All other beliefs were classified as being 
positive (functional or rational). 
Afterwards, the beliefs were classified as core vs. peripheral beliefs, following J. Beck 
(1995) according to the following three criteria:  
1) Did the participants experience strong emotions during the exploration of the  
  belief? 
2) If asked, were the participants able to describe additional situations in which the  
  respective belief is important? 
3) Is there a strong conviction about the respective belief? 
These three criteria for differentiating between core and peripheral beliefs were chosen 
because they could be examined while applying the downward arrow procedure. In constrast, 
the criteria concerning changes of beliefs within the setting of psychotherapy could not be 
tested within our design. Only those beliefs that fulfilled all of the criteria were classified as 
core beliefs.  
Finally, beliefs were categorized as positive or negative core or peripheral beliefs by 
consensus of three raters (who were blind to the hypotheses of the study). The interrater 
reliability was 0.96 (kappa). The raters were doctoral students with two and three years of 
therapeutical experience. 
For each category (positive and negative beliefs, positive and negative peripheral beliefs, 
positive and negative core beliefs) the value for “power” was calculated by summing the 
conviction values explored by the question ”On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strong is your 
conviction about this belief?”. Due to this procedure, the number of beliefs as well as the 
strength of conviction about a belief are reflected in the value of “power.” Due to the very 
definition of core and peripheral beliefs which implies that the strength of conviction is higher 
for core than for peripheral beliefs, power cannot be independent from the dimension of core 
dysthymia and major depression 11 
vs. peripheral beliefs. However, as no comparison between core and peripheral beliefs has 
been provided, this detail is negligible in this study. 
The reported significance levels were corrected by degrees of freedom according to 
Greenhouse and Geisser (1959). In order to check whether the strain situations in terms of 
negative life events differ between both groups, the reported situations were assessed by three 
raters (who were blind to the hypotheses of the study) on a scale from 0 to 100. The interrater 
reliability was 0.85 (kappa). The reported situations showed a mean of 26.67 and a standard 
deviation of 20.71 for the normal/control group, a mean of 36.25 and a standard deviation of 
26.69 for the dysthymic groups, and a mean of 31.67 and a standard deviation of 25.08 for the 
depressed group. No significant group differences were found for severity of the reported 
situations (Chi(2) = 0.91, p = .678).  
Results 
The data analysis (Kruskal-Wallis test) showed significant differences between the groups 
for both the positive beliefs (Chi(2) = 8.015, p < .05) and the negative beliefs (Chi(2) = 7.263, 
p < .05). The same significant differences were found for the positive (Chi(2) = 9.524, p < 
.01) as well as the negative (Chi(2) = 7.429, p < .05) core beliefs. Significant differences 
between the groups could only be found for the negative peripheral beliefs (Chi(2) = 8.537, p 
< .05), but not for the positive peripheral beliefs. The descriptive data with regard to the 
participants are shown in Table 1. 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests were calculated for paired testing of possible differences between 
the groups. As we applied three pair comparisons to each Kruskal-Wallis test, we used a 
corrected p-value of .033 as indicating significance for there multiple comparisons.  
For positive beliefs, a significant difference between the normal and the depressed 
participants was found (p < .033), with a higher mean rank for power of positive beliefs 
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(summed conviction values) in normal participants than in depressed participants. No 
significant differences were found for dysthymic participants.  
For negative beliefs, a significant difference between normal and dysthymic participants 
was found (p < .033), with a higher mean rank for power of negative beliefs in dysthymic 
participants. No significant differences were found for depressed participants.  
For positive core beliefs, a significant difference between normal and depressed participants 
was found (p < .033), but the group of dysthymics did not differ from either of the other 
groups. This result is due to the significantly higher mean rank for power of the positive core 
beliefs in normal participants.  
For negative core beliefs, a significant difference between normal and depressed 
participants was found due to the higher mean rank for power in the depressed group. The 
dysthymic group did not differ from any of the other groups.  
For negative peripheral beliefs, a significant difference between normal and dysthymic 
participants could be found due to the higher mean rank for power of beliefs in the dysthymic 
participants(p < .033), whereas no differences could be found for the depressed participants. 
The results are summarized in Table 2.  
Discussion 
Based on the cognitive theory of depression (Beck, A. T., 1976, 1987, 1991, 1997), the 
model by Schwartz and Garamoni (1986), and empirical findings (Akisksal et al., 1997; Judd 
et al., 1997; Judd et al., 1998), we postulated a one-dimensional continuum of the core and 
peripheral beliefs, ranging from normal to dysthymic to depressed. We expected to find a one-
dimensional continuum in that the normal participants show the greatest power (summed 
conviction values) in positive core and peripheral beliefs and the least power in negative core 
and peripheral beliefs. The dysthymic participants were expected to show less power in 
positive core and peripheral beliefs and greater power in negative core and peripheral beliefs 
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than the normal participants.The dysthymic participants should show the least power in 
positive core and peripheral beliefs and the greatest power in negative core and peripheral 
beliefs. Our results were expected to thus support an underlying, clinically relevant continuum 
of unipolar depression. 
Our analyses show that the power (summed conviction values) of normal participants in 
negative beliefs and negative peripheral beliefs is significantly smaller than that of the 
dysthymic group. Compared with the depressed group the normal participants had a 
significantly higher value for power in positive beliefs in general as well as in positive core 
beliefs. Furthermore, the normal participants show significantly lower values for power in 
negative core beliefs. No differences were found between dysthymic and depressed 
participants in any comparison. No further differences were found between the groups 
concerning positive peripheral beliefs.  
These results are not in accordance with the expectations derived from the structural model 
of positive and negative states of mind by Schwartz and Garamoni (1986) and point to the 
conclusion that we should not simply assume a one-dimensional continuum ranging from 
normal to dysthymic to depressed. Strikingly, normal and dysthymic participants differ only at 
the category of negative peripheral beliefs, whereas the belief systems of normal and 
depressive participants differ with respect to the positive and negative core beliefs. 
Apparently, the severity of affective symptoms is related to the strength of the deviating 
beliefs. Thus it can be concluded that negative core beliefs are more related to pathological 
symptoms of an affective disorder than are the respective peripheral beliefs. Furthermore a 
main characteristic of core beliefs is their influence on different kinds of situations (Beck, J., 
1995; Safran et al., 1986). Thus, fostering negative core beliefs activates negative emotions in 
a variety of situations, as manifested in major depression. Negative peripheral beliefs, on the 
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other hand, are more specific with regard to situations and associated with less intense 
emotions, leading to dysthymic mood instead.  
The chronic character of dysthymia seems to contradict this explanation. However, the 
significant deviation in negative peripheral beliefs between normal and dysthymic participants 
is actually due to the long duration of dysthymia. In the course of major depression, there are 
phases in which positive beliefs can become dominant; dysthymia, on the other hand, can take 
a more constant course over several years, thus leading to the development of a long-term 
dominance of negative beliefs. According to Ingram (1984), negative information is only 
processed when negative beliefs are activated, thus leading to a strengthened system of 
peripheral beliefs. A. T. Beck (1987, 1997) acknowledges the possibility that a long-term 
dominance of beliefs may lead to the development of additional congruent beliefs. If so, the 
activated beliefs control information processing, making it difficult to process dissonant 
information (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), while at the same time enhancing the perception and 
processing of consonant information. In sum, it could be hypothesized that the number of 
beliefs added to an activated belief might therefore be directly related to the frequency and 
duration of activation of the respective belief. However, according to this explanation we 
would expect fewer positive peripheral beliefs in dysthymic than normal subjects; this is not 
the case. This might be due to the small sample size in the current study. On the other hand, 
higher frequency and longer duration of activation of negative beliefs might lead to increased 
formation of additional negative beliefs. However, this should not have an influence on the 
development of positive peripheral beliefs.  
Based on our findings, we conclude that althought dysthymic people do not have more 
negative core beliefs than normal people, their core beliefs are activated over longer periods of 
time, leading to more powerful peripheral beliefs. On the contrary, depressed and non-
depressed people do differ with regard to core beliefs. The fact that depressed participants in 
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our sample did not develop more powerful negative peripheral beliefs can be explained by the 
episodic character of major depression.  
In sum, our exploration of belief systems of non-depressed, dysthymic and depressive 
participants supports distinct conditions rather than a one-dimensional continuum of unipolar 
depression. Non-depressed participants differ from dysthymic participants primarily in the 
category of negative peripheral beliefs, whereas non-depressed participants differ from 
depressive participants mainly in the category of core beliefs. Apparently, severity and the 
chronic character of the mood disorder are related to these differences.  
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Table 1: Descriptive data of the normal, dysthymic, and depressive participants. 




mean rank median/ 
range 
power 




Pos. B 125.00/  
0-260 
22.29 35.00/  
0-150  
14.31 0.0/  
0-190 
12.17 




22.13 200.0/  
60-385 
18.17 
Pos. C 0.00/ 
0-100 
20.67 0.0/  
0-0 
14.00 0.0/  
0-0 
14.00 
Neg. C 70.00/  
0-165 
11.96 90.0/  
0-100 
14.94 100.0/  
60-190 
22.08 
Pos. P 87.50/  
0-360 
20.04 60.0/  
0-150 
16.38 0.0/  
0-190 
13.04 




23.75 100.0/   
0-285 
16.88 
power = summed conviction of beliefs; pos. B = all positive beliefs; neg. B = all negative 
beliefs; pos. C = positive core beliefs; neg. C = negative core beliefs; pos. P = positive 
peripheral beliefs; neg. P = negative peripheral beliefs; * = .05; ** = .01 
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Table 2: Wilcoxon rank sum tests of the significant Kruskal-Wallis tests between normal, 
dysthymic, and depressive participants. 
 Normal vs. Dysthymia Normal vs. Depression Dysthymia vs. Depression 
 w-value p-value w-value p-value w-value p-value 
pos. B 59.5 .056 105.0 .008** 119.0 .554 
neg. B 93.0 .011* 118.0 .064 114.0 .354 
pos. C 64.0 .041 120.0 .014* 126.0 1.00 
neg. C 114.5 .369 107.0 .012* 60.0 .059 
neg. P 91.0 .007** 122.5 .110 103.0 .076 
one-tailed; pos. B = all positive beliefs; neg. B = all negative beliefs; pos. C = positive core 
beliefs; neg. C = negative core beliefs; neg. P = negative peripheral beliefs; * = .033; ** = .01 
 
 
 
 
